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you disapprove. But it undoubtedly represents the modern trend, and is in keeping
with the "spirit of the code." Assuming it is adopted, why was it not dearly stated in
the act, as it is in the black-letter discussion? Why was the problem misstated to be
one of joinder of parties rather than one of joinder of causes of action? Why were the
two sections in the act confused by the introduction of foreign problems concerning
"necessary parties" and alternative causes of action? Why were the two sections used,
with almost entirely different phraseology and even physical appearance, as though
the problem of joinder of plaintiffs were fundamentally different from that of joinder
of defendants? The first part of section twenty-three will illustrate the confused
language: "Subject to rules, all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs, in whom
any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where
if such persons had brought separate actions any common question of law or fact
would arise ....
" Remember, the rule is an indefinite (flexible) one, and the test is
trial convenience. Does not section twenty-three leave the impression that the rule is
a definite one, and is based upon something about a "transaction or series of transactions"? What is a "transaction"? Will the maze of confusion attending its use for
determining permissible joinder of causes of action involving the same parties, as
used in the typical act following the New York Code, be eliminated by adding: "or
series of transactions"? Is any part of this section understandable? Is there anything
in it that states or even intimates that "administrative convenience determines what
claims shall be tried together"?2
But little would be gained by a further discussion of the defects in these or other
sections of the act. We should rejoice that several such defects of other codes were
eliminated when this act was revised by the committee. Those remaining forceably
indicate the need for this book and explain why hope can be expressed that, with its
aid, the interpretation of the act by the courts of Illinois will be more in keeping with
that "spirit of the code" so well explained in these annotations.
* Professor

of Law, University of Chicago.
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Handbook of Criminal Law. By Justin Miller. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
1934. I vol. Pp. xiii, 649. $5.00.
This book should prove a handy reference volume for busy lawyers, stating briefly,
with illustrations drawn from the cases, the well-accepted principles of substantive
criminal law. While largely based on common law offenses, it also indicates their important statutory variations.' It is a revision of Mikell's edition of Clark's Criminal
Law,' and Dean Miller's efforts have given it considerable increased utility.
The book has been pretty thoroughly revised, although there are some relatively
unimportant parts which reproduce the older edition with only minor changes in text
2P. 44; n. i.
I See degrees of murder, pp. 273-278; mayhem, pp. 291-292; aggravated assaults, pp. 309312; burglary, p. 339; degrees of larceny, pp. 373-374; abortion, pp. 444-5;.federal offenses re-

lating to health, morals, comfort, and economic welfare, pp. 445-452, etc.
2 West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. igi.
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or footnotes.3 A good deal of new material has been added.4 In some places this has
been done to clarify the text,s and in others more adequately to take account of statutory developments. 6 Citations to law review articles, and a large number of new cases,
have been added to the footnotes.7
The scope of the work has been increased. A new chapter, "The Criminal Act," 8
has been added, on definition, causation, unintended consequences, and corpus delicti,
greatly expanding matters rather briefly treated under homicide in the previous edition. The first eighteen pages are wholly new, dealing briefly with procedure, administration, penology, crime surveys, and the general purposes of punishment, and
implemented with valuable references to law reviews, other texts, digest sections, and
cases. Little use, however, has been made of these general considerations in later portions of the book.
So much for the busy lawyers, but what of the judges and students, for whom the
book is also written?9 A short text for all three is almost impossible to write, and while
this book does tell what the law has been held to be in the past, it does not consistently offer a "direction for profitable thinking" about what the law ought to be, either
to judges, who are in a position to do something about it, or to students, who can at
least think about it.
The book does not purport to, and indeed could not, in the space available, include
a detailed analysis, crime by crime and defense by defense, of the considerations of
social policy which underlie, or should underlie, the substantive criminal law, and the
effect which they should have thereon. The present edition goes further in this regard
than the last, for Dean Miller has added a short introductory paragraph to many
crimes and defenses, outlining the considerations which have led to the creation
thereof. It is, however, a source of regret to the reviewer that Dean Miller has not felt
free to put more of his own views on such subjects into the book. The passages where
this has been doneoo serve only to whet the appetite for more, but unfortunately they
are the exception rather than the rule.
For instance, the problem of so-called "constructive intent" is one of the most vexing problems of the substantive criminal law, as to both legal definition and rational
justification. Here the text does no more than state the doctrine in terms of Hale's
day-a death in the course of a felony is murder; a death or injury in the course of a
misdemeanor nudum in se is manslaughter or assault and battery-with illustrations
3See abortion, pp. 443-444; fornication, pp. 432-433; prison breach, pp. 465-466.
4Roughly, the content of the book has been increased by half, while increasing the number

of pages less than ioper cent, by a narrower type and a closer spacing of lines.
sFor example, attempt and conspiracy, pp. 95-117; insanity, pp. 122-136; express and
implied malice, pp. 265-267; embezzlement, pp. 374-38i; intent in larceny, pp. 365-367;
former jeopardy, pp. 534-544.
6 See juvenile courts, pp. 121-122; degrees of murder, pp. 273-278; degrees of larceny, pp.
373-374; malicious mischief, pp. 400-404; fraudulent checks, pp. 390-391.
7Nearly 2500 cases havebeen added to the 3ooo odd citedin theprevious edition, not counting a considerable substitution of cases.
I C. 6, pp. 77-94.
9 Preface, p. v.

10For instance, as to the purpose of criminal law, pp. 17-,9; corporate liability, pp. 148i5o; entrapment, pp. i8o-i8s; malicious mischief, pp. 4oo-4o4; former jeopardy, p. 538.
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and a few instances in which it has not been applied." Surely the tremendous growth
of non-dangerous felonies since 1676 requires some limitation on the murder rule;and an examination of the use and abuse of crimes "mala in se" in manslaughter leads
one irresistibly to the conclusion that this curious survival in modern jurisprudence
of a rule of canon law copies by Bracton before 1268 from Bernard of Pavia,3 is now
utilized by many courts as a means of individualizing punishment where other means
are not available.14
The criteria by which such individualization should be governed cannot be found
in the undefinable phrase "malum in se";s possibly the solution is to say that where
a man wilfully commits a misdemeanor he has embarked on a course of conduct known
to be wrong, thus supplying the "moral element" commonly required for criminal
recklessness,16 and may properly be punished for ordinary negligence. Certainly the
added punishment for an accidental homicide or injury will have no deterrent effect
with regard to the commission of the original misdemeanor, unless the risk of such
injury is at least great enough to make the defendant's conduct negligent with regard
thereto. A few words from Dean Miller on this and other similar problems would have
been most illuminating.
LiVINGSToN HALL*

* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard University.

"Pp. 268-270, 285-286, 313-315, and generally pp. 6x-65.
12See
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale LJ. 537 at 569
(1934): ".... ifthe person is engaged at the time in perpetrating or attempting a felony
....it includes the wilful doing of any act which involves a substantial element of human
risk..... "
13Bracton, f. 120-121; see Maitland, "Bracton and Azo," Vol. VIII, Publications 6f the
Selden Society, (1894) p. 232. Such a far-flung net of culpable homicide was proper in the
canon law, with its many gradations of punishment, but could only produce injustice in the
early common law courts, where the alternatives were death or acquittal.
'4 See Tulin, The Role of Penalties in Criminal Law, 37 Yale L.J. xo48 (1928), for an
explanation of the analogous cases holding reckless driving sufficient for an assault and battery,
or occasionally an assault with intent to kill.
isCf. Bentham, Comment on the Commentaries (Everett's ed. 1928), 8o:

"....

the

acute distinction between ma/a in se and mala prohibitawhich being so shrewd and sounding so
pretty, and being in Latin, has no sort of an occasion to have any meaning to it; accordingly
it has none."
x6 Rex v. Greisman, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 738, 46 Can. C.C. 172; Rex v. Baker, [1929] 1 D.L.R.
785, 5i Can. C.C. 7i; contra, Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. i65 (1884).

